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GOVERNMENT-OWNED FINANCIAL 
INSTITUTIONS 
By Kazuhito IKEO' and Yasuhiko TANIGAWA" 
Introducdon 
This paper attempts to make a theoretical analysis of the role of government-
owned financial institutions. OUf argument is based on the recent development of 
the -theory of financial intermediaries, which has its foundation on the new micro-
economics of information. 
Many arguments have been raised in these years regarding the present state of 
government-owned financial institutions in Japan. In our opinion, however, most of 
these arguments cannot be said to have enough ground of ecoriomic theory. In other 
words, we find there has not been enough theoretical studies of the role to be played 
by government-owned financial institutions. As it is, we aim to consider the role of 
government-owned financial institutions from a theoretical standpoint, without losing 
the sight of the present state of government-owned financial institutions in Japan. 
In presenting our study, we will first provide· a brief summary of the present state 
oflending activities by government-owned financial institutions in Japan as the premises 
of our discussion.· This summary is followed by a short argument regarding the raison 
d' etre or rationale of such lending activities on the basis of the recent theory of financial 
intermediaries. These will be the First part of our study. In the Second part, we will 
undertake a more detailed analysis of the raison d'etre of activities by a special type of 
government-owned financial institutions like the Small Business Finance Corporation, 
among several types of government-owned financial institutions. Thereafter, this paper 
will be concluded by brief ·remarks on the significance of our analysis in relation to 
the actual condition in Japan. 
I Guidance Policy Finance 
The public sector is tied to financial markets because it must adjust the balance of 
its saving and investment. For instance, all of the advanced countries, including 
Japan, are now under chronic budgetary deficit. To finance the deficit, the governments 
issue large amount of bonds every year. At the same time, the public sector is partici':' 
pating in financial markets as an intermediary. In other words, the public sector 
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raises funds not only to finance its deficit but also to lend the funds to other sectors. 
The lending activities by the public sector are usually referred to the term "guidance 
policy finance". We shall start our argument by reviewing the present state of such 
guidance policy finance in japan. 
I-I. Present State of tm Guidance Policy Finance in lapan 
[A] In japan, a part of funds of the Fiscal Investment and Loan Plan (FILP) is 
allocated to government-owned financial institutions, corresponds to the guidance policy 
finance. Other parts ofFILP such as the allocations to the central and local governments 
and the allocations to public agencies undertaking investments, as well as the acceptance 
of government bonds by the Trust Bureau Funds, should be regarded as financing the 
public sector's spending itself. 
According to the Money Flow Accounts published by the Bank of japan, the total 
assets of public financial institutions stood at 225.61 trillion yen at the end of fiscal year 
1986. About 66% of this amount, 148.25 trillion yen, however, represented credit 
extended to the central government, the local governments and other public agencies. 
Therefore, the difference between the two, 77.36 tri11ion yen, was the net credit extended 
to non-public sectors as the guidance policy finance. On the other hand, assets of 
private financial institutions amounted to 675.52 trillion yen, of which 116.84 trillion yen 
was financed to the public sector. 
As is well known, the Japanese system of public financing is a conglomerate of 
various institutions, each of which has only a partial function of financial intermediary. 
Of these institutions, the postal office is typical of the institutions responsible for raising 
funds, and the postal saving account is its main instrument to raise funds. All raised 
funds are allocated according to the FILP. By virtue of the above argument, we 
regard that 2/3 of the balance of the postal saving account is defacto the small lot public 
bond, while the rest 1/3 corresponds to indirect securities serving as an instrument of 
financial intermediation. 
Against these suppliers of funds, there are two banks and nine financial corpora-
tions at present, which are so-called "government-owned financial institutions" respon-
sible for allocation of the funds used for the guidance policy finance. The fact that 
there exist so many government-owned financial institutions shows that a system of 
specialized financial institutions is adopted in the guidance policy financing as well as 
in private financing in Japan. Thus each institution has specific scope of lending. 
Table I shows composition of the total balance of funds managed under the 
guidance policy financing plan for these two banks, nine financial corporations, and the 
Overseas Economic Cooperation Fund as well as Shoko Chukin Bank (The Central Bank 
for Commercial and Industrial Cooperatives). Shoko Chukin Bank is a private bank, 
but the Japanese government holds a part of its shares. 
What we can see immediately from this table is that the outstanding importance of 
financing extended to small and medium-sized firms in the recent years, along with the 
following importance of housing loan. At least quantitatively, it can be said that the 
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Table 1. Composition offunds managed under the guidance policy finance in Japan (%) 
FY 1975 1983 1984 1985 1986 
Development Financing 12.6 9.4 9.4 9.3 9.3 
Trade/Overseas Coop. 18.2 14.2 14.5 13.7 13.7 
Small Firm Financing 41.6 42.5 43.5 44.5 44.5 
Housing Loan 16.2 25.9 25.3 25.8 25.8 
Agriculture, Forestry & 6.5 4.7 4.5 4.5 4.5 
Fishery Financing 
Miscellaneous 4.9 3.3 2.8 2.2 2.2 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Source: The Development Bank of Japan 
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main drive of the guidance policy finance has been directed to these two areas. The 
guidance policy financing to small and medium firms is executed by the Small Business 
Finance Corporation, the People's Finance Corporation, and Shako Chukin Bank. 
The share of these three government-affiliated financial institutions in the total balance 
of outstanding loans to small and medium firms, however, has declined from 12.80/0 for 
capital formating and operating funds (21.7% for capital formation only) at the end of 
fiscal year 1975 to 10.6% (15.9%) by the end of fiscal year 1985. 
This decline presents a sharp contrast to the fact that the ratio of guidance policy 
finance to private financing bas increased from 11.8% at the end of fiscal year 1975 to 
15.9% at the end of fiscal year 1985. Tbe growth of the guidance policy financing, 
however, occurred for the most part due to expansion of housing loans (from 2.4~~ to 
6.0%). Tbe total shares of the Small Business Finance Corporation and People'S 
Finance Corporation in comparison with private financing shows no marked change 
(from 2.6% to 2.5%) during the period. Tberefore, the gradual declining tendency 
mentioned above is mainly due to the strong drive on the side of private financial in-
stitutions to expand their business with smaller firms. 
[B] In the recent years, several issues have been raised concerning the present 
state of the Fiscal Investment and Loan Plan (FILP) which includes the guidance 
policy finance. According to Hayashi (1987), these issues can ber elated to one of the 
following three problems: 
(I) About 20% of the funds authorized under FILP remains unused recently. 
(2) The amount of subsidies provided by the general budget account of the Japanese 
government to the government-owned financial institutions is showing a significant 
increase. 
(3) The lending interest rate by the government-owned financial institutions is relatively 
higher than those by private financial institutions, as their funding cost has stayed at 
a high level. 
With regard to the first problem, most of the unused portion is the allocations to 
the local governments, and the problem is not so apparent insofar as the government-
owned financial institutions are concerned. Even so, however, we may legitimately 
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suspect that, in the view of the ever increasing share of the guidance policy finance, 
the apparent success of these government-owned financia:l institutions in absorbing their 
share of FILP is ascribable to their exeess aggressiveness. They might go beyond the 
assigned role to complement private financing by cutting into the private institutions' 
territory. 
The second problem, which is related to our suspicion just pointed Qut, leads to 
another question whether the government-owned financial institutions should he 
encouraged to expand their shares with bearing losses. Indeed, there exists a valid 
cri ticism that the size of the guidance policy finance has already becoine too large. 
Although this criticism might be right, it must be'recognized that deficits of govern-
ment-owned financial institutions cannot be a measure whether these institutions have 
become excessively large. Since the guidance policy finance extends to those areas 
where credit is not easily available privately for one reason or other, additional costs 
naturally involve in it. 
For fiscal year 1985, the estimated financial support to the government-owned 
financial institutions was 552.5 billion yen, of which 341.3 billion yen or 61.8% was the 
support for the Housing Loan Corporation. This corporation must provide housing loans 
to people at low costs in order to promote construction of private housing units, and 
for this reason, the generated deficit is accepted. Therefore, adequacy of the finance, 
under such circumstances, should not be judged on the basis of the existence of such 
defiCit, but rather by considering whether its si;:-:e is reasonable compared to the actual 
effect of the guidance policy in question. Generally speaking, the guidance policy 
finance is justified as long as its social benefit is greater than its costs. 
In this respect, the third problem essentially gives rise to an issue -regarding how 
the costs of guidance policy finance are shared. So far, under "the artificial low interest 
rate policy", the costs of the guidance policy finance were shared by savers through an 
implicit taxation on deposits (the prevailing rate in money markets minus the regulated 
rate of deposit corresponds to the tax rate). The recent deregulation in financial 
markets, however, is making it more difficult to maintain the traditional structure of cost 
sharing. The third problem does indeed point out this difficulty. 
Thus, it is now inevitable that the costs of the guidance policy finance are to be as-
sumed directly by taxpayers. This means that we must be more cautious about the cost/ 
benefit relationship in the guidance policy financing, compared with the previous 
practice where the cost was rather ambiguously shared. In other words, we must 
know whether the burden shared by taxpayers is justifiable in view of the social benefit 
due to the guidance policy finance, that is, whether the the former has become over-
grown and hence is an excessive burden or not. 
In order to allow ourselves such comparative assessment, it is necessary to take a 
theoretical approach so that we can have a clear idea about the benefit derived from the 
policy. As we have said already, the recent deregulation in financial markets has 
made it easier to assess the cost of the guidance policy finance. Nevertheless, it is not 
so-simple to evaluate the benefit because it does not accrue in any tangible manner. but 
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likes to be dispersed all over the society. For this reason, many aspects of the accrued 
benefit could easily remain unnoticed unless we are practically careful in finding them. 
This situation leads us to the need of theoretical exercises which will be argued in the 
following section. 
1-2. Raison d'Cere of the Guidance Policy Finance 
[AJ Up to now, the prevailing understanding about the guidance policy finance 
has been that its purpose is making funds available and/or providing funds at a 'lower 
cost to those sectors who have difficulty in getting access to private financing. Normally 
the first of these functions, to make funds available, is referred to as "the quantitative 
complementing function", and the second, to provide funds at a lower cost, as "the 
qualitative complementing function". 
Nevertheless, from the view point of economics, it may not always be possible to 
distinguish these two functions clearly. This is because availability of funds also 
represents the financial cost if we take account of "the shadow price". While keeping 
this in mind, we should yet adopt the distinction between the quantitative and 
qualitative complementary functions and try to examine each of them one by one. 
Among those sectors who normally have difficulty in getting access to sufficient 
funds through private financing alone, resource and energy-related development pro-
jects are probably the most significant. Although these projects are likely to be highly 
profitable from a social point of view, they of ten_ involve high risks and take a long 
period of time to crop the results. 
There are possibly two reasons that it is difficult for these projects to obtain enough 
finance from private institutions. First, these institutions do not have adequate 
capability to evaluate (or screen) these projects. Second, in many instances these 
projects have risks that are too high for the private institutions to take. Putting it 
differently, in order for the government-owned financial institutions to perform .the 
function of quantitative complement, it is necessary that they have better capability to 
evaluate these projects and/or to bear the inherent risks more than private lenders. 
The public sector is actually engaged in planning and implementation of macro-
economic policies on national scale. Thus, it is usually in a much better position than 
private institutions to evaluate the projects of this nature. In these instances, it is 
desirable that the financing is led by the government-owned financial institutions. 
However, they do not need to provide the whole funds by themselves. By arranging 
a syndicate loan with the private financial institutions on the basis of their wealth of 
expertise in this domain, the government-owned financial institutions can adequately 
perform the complementary role. 
Moreover, while in the case of private institutions their stockholders and depositors 
are exposed to the risks as the final resort (unless deposits are insured by the government), 
the government-owned financial institutions can spread the risks among taxpayers at 
large. Therefore, with regard to these "national projects", or those which require long 
lead .. time and thus long period of time before the fruits of the investments are realized, 
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the government-owned financial institutions can assume the risks more effectively. In 
such cases, giving a guarantee for credit or direct lending by the government-owned 
financial institutions could contribute to achieve the allocation of risks more effectively 
from the social point of view. 
The Development Bank of Japan or similar type of the government-owned financial 
institutions seem to be actually performing this function as organs of the guidance 
policy financing. 
[B] The second area where the quantitative complementary function is needed 
is financing for individuals, small firms, farmers and fishermen. Borrowers in this 
category do not have sufficient credit-worthiness or collaterals in common. In general, 
their investment projects differ greatly from each other in the expected return and risks. 
Moreover, compared with those of the above mentioned national scale ones, risks involved 
in these projects are quite so small that there should be little need to allocate them 
beyond the framework of private financing~ 
Especially in the case of financing to small firms, each investment project is so 
different in nature that, in order to evaluate it effectively, one must have highly specific, 
not general, knowledge and experience about the particular field in question. Thus, 
it is not appropriate to allege, a priori, which of government-owned or private financial 
institutions have better capability to evaluate such projects. Depending on the nature 
of projects and the past experience of an institution, the institution could have a 
special advantage in evaluating projects. 
If a government-owned financial institution has been working with financing of 
smaller firms for instance, it is highly probable that it has developed better ability to 
evaluate such projects through its experience. Nevertheless, in such the case, what we 
have already said in the above would apply anyway. Therefore, let us turn to a case 
in which a government-owned financial institution does not have such a superior 
capability in the field in question. 
In this case, the quantitative complementing function by the government-owned 
financial institution is virtually subsidization. The difficulty for the borrowers in these 
field to get credit from private financial institutions is mainly due to their needs for 
preferential terms of lending. That is, if they agree to pay the price prevailing in the 
private financial market, they can find lenders with fund. Under such circumstances, if 
government-owned financial institutions offer more attractive conditions than private 
institutions, it means that the borrowers are subsidized by the government. 
The qualitative complementing function should be understood as subsidizing in the 
same context, as long as the price to be paid by the borrowers is less than the opportunity 
cost. Even if the government-owned financial institutions can actually raise funds at 
lower cost for some reasons, their lending is still a sort of subsidies. 
As well known, this type of subsidy can be justified when there is a gap between 
private and social return on the project, i.e., when there is certain "externality", or when 
it is necessary to modify unfair distribution of income. Nevertheless, if subsidizing is in 
itself the purpose, it should not be in the form of cheaper financing by the government-
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owned financial institutions. In order for such form to be justified, there must be 
additional reasons for making it advantageous to combine subsidizing and financing in 
the same deal. 
For instance, if direct subsidizing may cause moral hazard in the private sector, 
or if classifying firms into qualified and unqualified groups for the purpose of subsidizing 
needs costly screening process, then guidance policy finance by way of subsidy may be 
justified. A typical example is the "statistical discrimination" in bank loan market, 
which could make the guidance policy finance effective. 
The statistical discrimination refers to a situation in which several groups, each 
distinguished from the others by its unalterable "indices", exist and it is empirically 
known that each group has a different probability to include "good" and "bad" entities. 
Then an entity belonging to a particular group known to include a relatively large 
number of "bad" is disadvantaged, even if it is a "good" one (cJ. Spence [1974]). 
Putting it in the context of bank loan market, for example, suppose that a group of 
small size firms is perceived to include comparatively larger number of "bad" entities 
(i.e., with a high risk of default) than a group of large size firms is. Then, compared 
with a large firm of "good" quality, a small firm of equivalent quality is discriminated 
because of the negative external effect caused by the existence of many "bad" firms in 
the same group. 
In these instances, if a government-owned financial institution would extend 
preferential financing to the discriminated small firm, it could improve an allocation of 
financial resources. This is essentially a Pigou-type subsidy policy through the pre-
ferential financing to offset the negative external effects. Since it is neither appropriate 
nor possible to grant subsidies to aU small firms, the financial institution must have the 
capability to evaluate borrowers and determine if they are entitled to preferential terms 
or not. For this reason, with proper justification, subsidizing and financing can take 
place as a package at the same time. 
In Japan, this type of the guidance policy financing is undertaken by the Small 
Business Finance Corporation and some other governmental institutions of the like nature. 
As it is, in the following section, we shall furthermore study the significance of the guidance 
policy financing in an environment where the statistical discrimination is prevailing in 
the bank loan market. 
n More Analytical Discussion 
2-1. Statistical Discrimination and the Market Failure 
A financial intermediary usually evaluates the projects of a firm before it lends 
money to the firm. If the project doesn't deserve to make a loan, the application of 
the firm will be rejected. The conditions of the loan, if it lends money to the firm, will 
depend upon the result of the evaluation. In either case, the intermediary must incur 
the cost of the evaluation. 
Even if the size of a loan and the evaluating cost of a potential lender do not vary, 
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the effective evaluating costs will be different for intermediaries. This is because some 
intermediaries seldom experience evaluations which do not lead to lending, others may 
frequently. Therefore, a financial intermediary minimizes the evaluation costs by 
denying applications from firms in an un-prospective group without evaluating the 
application. It is natural that financial intermediaries find out indices by which they 
can discriminate prospective borrowers from the un-prospectives, as they have much 
experience in lending business. At least they may estimate the effective cost of eva-
luation by the indices, and charge more for horrowers in the unprospective group. 
This is the statistical discrimination. 
These discriminations may, however, cause allocative inefficiency, if firms with the 
same social value are differently treated. Consider two firms, for example, with the 
same projects, but different 'in size. If an intermediary uses firm size as an index ,to 
discriminate .potential borrowers, one of the two may not borrow money. The rejecied 
project will not be executed. Thus, financial resources are invested differently into the 
two similar projects. 
The reason that such an index is used for discrimination is that such an index, firm 
size in our example, has nothing to do with the quality of the project of a firm, but it 
tells the average quality of projects of firms whose indices are the same. Firms with 
good projects may be treated unfavorably, because other firms with the same index 
have bad projects. Since indices cannot be changed, nor selected, there is no means 
to get along with the results brought by the index. The market mechanism cannot 
eliminate the external dis~economy within firms of the same index. 
Therefore, other instruments are required to cope with the inefficiency caused by 
the statistical discrimination. Introducing the government is one of the candidates 
for remedy. Before comparing alternatives, however, it would be helpful to examine 
a simple model of statistical discrimination in a financial market. 
2-2. Model of Statistical Discrimination in a Financial Market 
Let's suppose the following situation. Every firm has a project which requires one 
unit of money. There is only one type of financial intermediary called a bank. So 
bank lending is the only means for financing. A project will be undertaken if the 
lending rate from a bank is lower than a cut~off rate. A cut~off rate' represents the 
quality of the project, i.e., bad projects have low cut-off rates. Since bad projects have 
less prospective of success, the firm will not take such a project using funds with high 
interest. For simplicity, we assume there are only two types of projects, say GOOD and 
BAD. While GOOD projects will end with enough profit to return the money back, 
BAD won't. Let the cut-off rate of GOOD projects be rG>O, and tbat of BAD be 
rB~O. Tbe type oftbe project is private knowledge of the firm. The ratio t of GOOD 
projects to total projects in the economy is commonly known. 
When a firm applies for a loan at a bank, the bank mayor may not evaluate the 
project of the firm. We suppose evaluation incurs cost C, and it correctly reveals the 
type of the project. Hit turns out to be BAD, the bank need not lend money. Without 
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evaluation, however, the bank must lend money to the firm irrespective of the type'of 
the project. 
Banks finance their money from a money market at the interest rate i. Banks can 
borrow any amount of money from the market without affecting the interest rate i. 
They need not borrow in advance. We assume also that the money market is so large 
that it can supply enough funds to a bank. The evaluation cost C, and the money 
market interest rate i are common to all banks. 
Let see the profit rates of banks. Let r be a lending rate to a firm, then the accrued 
interest from lending to a GOOD project is (r-i). When a hank evaluates a project 
with cost C, it expects to get t(r-i), since the probability that the project turns out to be 
GOOD and the bank lends money to the firm is t. Nothing but vainly evaluation with 
cost C happens with the probability (l-t). So the profit ofa bank which lends money 
to a firm evaluating projects becomes 
pE=t(r-i)+(I-t)O-C 
=t(r-i)-C. 
If a bank lends money without a project evaluation, it occurs with the probability (l-t) 
that the bank forgoes returns from the firm with a BAD project. In any case, the bank 
must pay interest i to the money market. Therefore, its profit becomes 
pNE=t(r_i) - (l-t)i. 
We would like to avoid the economies where no project is evaluated. S6 we 
assume the money market interest rate i is high enough to make lending without eva-
luation unprofitable. Namely, we assume 
i>Cf(I-t). 
This implies that in our economy money is so scarce that lending to a BAD project 
proves to be expensive. 
When banks compete with each other in the lending market, profit rate of a bank, 
P, must be zero. Under the above condition, banks lend money to a firm after 
evaluation. The lending rate in equilibrium will be 
rE=i+Cft, 
which solves PE=O. 
In order to avoid empty equilibrium, we assume that 
rGZi+C/t. 
In sum, the equilibrium without index is that banks evaluate applications from firms 
and that all GOOD projects are undertaken. No firm with a BAD project can borrow. 
Now we introduce an index on firms. The index is easily verified without any cost. 
It cannot be altered by firms. It classifies firms into several categories. For simplicity 
we confine the case where there are two types of firms, say LARGE and SMALL. As 
we have mentioned, the index tells nothing about the quality of the project of the firm. 
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Some LARGE firms have a GOOD project, other LARGE firms have a BAD one. 
Similarly, some SMALL firms have a GOOD project, other SMALL firms have a BAD 
one. Only the ratios of firms with a GOOD project to firms of the same type are 
different. Thus it tells the avar~ge quality of firms. We assume 
tL >t8 · 
This means there are more firms with a GOOD project in the LARGE group than in 
the SMALL group. Remember that t denotes the ratio of total number of firms with 
a GOOD project to the total number of firms. So the inequality 
tL>t>ts 
holds. 
Since firm size is observable, a bank wi1l easily discriminate a LARGE firm from 
a SMALL firm. It is known that the SMALL group contains fewer firms with a GOOD 
project. Costly evaluation of an application from a firm in the SMALL group tends 
to end in vain. So a bank, which seeks profits, requires higher interest on a SMALL 
firm. Therefore, lending rates on both group will be different. Let f1.o and fs denote 




Obviously, the lending rate on firms in SMALL group, fs, is higher than that on firms 
in LARGE group, rL. 
This causes allocative inefficiency. Some firms are treated unfavorably, even 
though everything but the index is the same. The index itself has no social value, but 
is priced by private banks. The example below helps to understand how the equilibrium 
of our private economy is inefficient. 
Suppose that the cut-off rate of a GOOD project ra is in the range below: 
ra<i+Cjt,. 
Then GOOD projects of firms in the SMALL group never get undertaken. The equi-
librium lending rate from banks is so high that the SMALL firm abandon the project. 
Note that without the statistical discrimination such GOOD projects of SMALL firms 
are also undertaken, since the lending interest rate, rE, is smaller than the cut-off rate 
of the firm, ra. tL>t>ts implies rL<rE<ra. 
2-3. Intermediation by the Government 
It is a kind of market failure that GOOD projects of firms in SMALL group are 
never executed. One of possible remedies is to levy a tax on banks which lend to 
LARGE firms, and to subsidize banks which lend to SMALL firms. 
There are two problems in this method. Firstly, it is difficult for the government 
to justify acquring information on the activities of private agents. Generally, private 
agents have freedom not to disclose their private information. Secondly, the cost to 
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know, to whom a bank lends money, is very high. This is because the government 
must check each lending. Otherwise, hanks could report all the lendings were given 
to SMALL firms, and increase profit.o;; with the subsidies it may get. 
These consideration suggests that the government itself should do banking business. 
It is necessary to execute both subsidizing and lending activities simultaneously. This 
does not imply that all lending must be done by the government. It is enough for the 
government to establish a special intermediary for SMALL firms. 
The government easily distinguishes private banks from public banks. So, with 
no extra cost, it can levy a tax on private banks so that their lending rates are risen to rE. 
The public bank lends money only to SMALL firms at the same rate rE , if an evaluation 
makes it clear that the firm has a GOOD project. The public bank also incurs the same 
evaluation cost C as the private banks. Receiving subsidies from the government 
will keep the public bank away from deficit. 
Since both private and public banks evaluate applications before lending, no firm 
with a BAD project can borrow. LARGE firms with a GOOD project borrow money 
from private banks, because they cannot borrow from the public bank. SMALL firms 
with a GOOD project borrow money from the public bank, because private banks 
require higher interest rate than that from the public bank. Their lending rates are equal. 
We have demonstrated that government-owned financial institutions can cope with 
the market failure caused by statistical discrimination. At first, it may seem that the 
economic structure we used was too specific. Nevertheless, despite the simplicity of 
our model, we feel that our conclusion will be valid in the real world. That is, the 
public sector must concern directly to the discrimination process itself, if it is desirable 
to avoid the inefficiency. 
Conclusion 
This paper points out the problem of external dis-economy which arises from the 
existence of ex ante information based on statistical data, and the significance of the 
guidance policy finance as its remedy. This problem and its relation to the guidance 
policy finance have seldom been recognized explicitly so far. We also give model 
analysis. According to our study, if there is really diseconomy with regard to financing 
of small firms, then the activity of government-owned financial institutions, intended to 
eliminate the disadvantage suffered by small firms through providing them with better 
financing terms enjoyed by large firms, can prove to be beneficial for improving efficien-
cy in resource allocation. 
It must be emphasized that the preferential terms of financing to small firms are 
to be applied because they serve to improve the efficiency, not to protect the weak or to 
treat everybody equally. As it is, only qualified finns, not all small firms, must be 
entitled to such preferential terms. For this reason, in order to the guidance policy 
financing to be really effective, the government-owned financial institutions should have 
capability in credit rating not inferior to that of private financial institutions. 
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If it were necessary to give preferential treatment to an small firms, such treatment 
would be clearly outside of the scope of the guidance policy financing. Everyone can 
easily identify whether firm is small or not so that direct subsidizing is enough for this 
purpose .. It would be not be appropriate to set the purpose of financing by Small Busi-
ness Finance Corporation and the like at the alleviation of unfair income distribution. 
If actual financing by these institutions has been in such a nature, it would be difficult 
to justify them. 
On the other hand, as delegulation of financial markets is proceeding, the govern-
ment-owned financial institutions have to more directly depend on the financial support 
from the government in order to provide preferential terms to the borrowers. It would 
be most efficient that the government levy taxes upon the entities benefiting from the 
external economy, i.e., large firms with good quality in our model. The implicit tax· 
ation on deposits to cover the cost of the guidance policy financing is no longer feasible, 
besides it is undesirable from the view point of welfare economics. 
This is the implications from our theoretical study in this paper. To advance our 
research further to assess the present state of the guidance policy finance in Japan, if 
we limit our scope to financing of small firms alone, it would be required a highly diffi· 
cult task to measure the magnitude of external economy as mentioned already. We can 
then conclude whether the size of the financial support given to the government·owned 
financial institutions, including those implicitly granted, is larger or not than the amount 
needed to offset the external effect. This kind of work is inevitable to determine 
the adequate scale of the guidance policy finance. 
Supposing difficulties with such kind of work, it must be agreed that most of 
arguments we have seen concerning the present state of the guidance policy finance are 
too prejudiced and without enough ground in economics. Including our own, economic 
analysis of the guidance policy finance is still at a very early stage of development. 
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